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DEPARTMENT PASS AID WASHDC AND ACDA WASHDC

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, XX, FI
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE: FINLAND

REF: STATE 167901,

1. US INTERESTS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES.
A. US INTERESTS--THE PRIMARY US INTEREST IN FINLAND IS
TO MAXIMIZE FINLAND'S RELATIVE NEUTRALITY AND INDEPENDENCE
FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND SUPPORT ITS POSITION AS A
WESTERN-ORIENTED, NON-COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
SOCIETY. BY DOING SO, WE REDUCE THE POTENTIAL THREAT OF
SOVIET MILITARY USE OF FINNISH TERRITORY, AND THE CONSEQUENT
DETERIORATION THIS WOULD ENTAIL FOR NATO AND NORTHERN FLANK
SECURITY. OWING TO ITS LOSS OF TWO WARS TO THE SOVIET
UNION (1939-40, 1941-44), ITS LONG COMMON BORDER,
AND SOVIET-IMPOSED TREATY LIMITATIONS ON ITS DEFENSE
FORCES AND CAPABILITIES, FINLAND LIES WITHIN THE AREA
OF SOVIET MILITARY DOMINANCE. THE CHALLENGE TO FINLAND

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HAS BEEN TO MAINTAIN A RECOGNIZABLY INDEPENDENT NATIONAL
EXISTENCE ON THE VERY FRONTIER OF THE SOVIET SUPER-
POWER. (THE FINNISH/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP IS ANALYZED
IN THE 1978 POLICY ASSESSMENT PAPER, HELSINKI 0460.)

B. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM OBJECTIVES.

(1) DISCUSSION--ONE OF THE IMPORTANT POLICY OBJECTIVES
FLOWING FROM THE US INTEREST IN FINLAND IS THE

MAINTENANCE OF A WESTERN-ORIENTED AND CREDIBLE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN FINLAND. BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS AND TREATY RESTRICTIONS ON FINLAND, REFERRED TO ABOVE, OPPORTUNITIES FOR MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FINLAND ARE LIMITED. THIS SITUATION ALSO SEVERELY LIMITS POSSIBILITIES FOR DEVELOPING SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND OBJECTIVES. ADDITIONALLY, WE HAVE SPARSE KNOWLEDGE OF FINNISH MILITARY PLANS. OUR OBJECTIVES, THEREFORE, CAN ONLY BE OF A MODEST AND GENERAL NATURE AND AIMED PRINCIPALLY AT BUILDING AND MAINTAINING RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE FINNISH MILITARY WHICH WILL CONTRIBUTE TO ITS WESTERN ORIENTATION AND TO ITS CREDIBILITY.

(2) GENERAL PROGRAM OBJECTIVES--THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, WHICH CONSISTS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY OF IMET, CONTRIBUTES TO WESTERN ORIENTATION BY ENCOURAGING ATTITUDES FAVORABLE TO US MILITARY DOCTRINE, EQUIPMENT, AND PERSONNEL, BY PROMOTING US MILITARY RAPPORT WITH MEMBERS OF THE FDF AND BY GIVING GRANTEES BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF US INSTITUTIONS IN GENERAL. IT ALSO CONTRIBUTES TO THE CAPABILITY OF THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT THROUGH THE QUALITY OF PROFESSIONAL TRAINING AIMED AT DEVELOPING EXPERTISE IN MANAGEMENT OF MILITARY RESOURCES. CREDIBILITY OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN FINLAND CANNOT BE ASSURED MERELY THROUGH A
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SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, AS IT DEPENDS ON POLICY DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF FINLAND AND ITS EFFORTS TO SURVIVE ALONGSIDE ITS DOMINANT NEIGHBOR. THIS FINNISH POLICY RELIES ON DIPLOMATIC RATHER THAN MILITARY RESOURCES. HOWEVER, THE MILITARY AS A PEACETIME INSTITUTION IS OF SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE IN MAINTAINING THE TRADITIONAL WESTERN VALUES ON WHICH FINLAND'S SOCIETY IS BASED. MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY HAVE INFLUENCE ON CIVILIAN POLICY AND CAN SUBSTANTIALLY INFLUENCE CIVILIAN ATTITUDES THROUGH THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM WHICH AFFECTS VIRTUALLY ALL MALE FINNS. THIS MILITARY/CIVILIAN RELATIONSHIP HELPS PROMOTE THE MAINTENANCE OF A CREDIBLE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. ALTHOUGH IMETP GRANTEES COMPRISE ONLY A SMALL PART OF THE OFFICER CORPS, THEY HAVE ROUTINELY BEEN ASSIGNED TO POSITIONS OF GREATER RESPONSIBILITY THAN THE AVERAGE OFFICER, CONTRIBUTING TO THE SUPPORT OF OUR POLICY OBJECTIVES.

(3) SPECIFIC PROGRAM OBJECTIVES.

(A) OVERALL

(I) ENCOURAGE FINLAND TO ENTER INTO CO-PRODUCTION PROJECTS OF WESTERN ARMS AND MUNITIONS TO FOSTER ECONOMIC

PROGRESS AND REDUCE DEPENDENCE UPON THE SOVIET UNION.

(II) ENCOURAGE CONTINUED USE OF THE IMET PROGRAM.

(B) ARMY

(I) ENCOURAGE INTEREST IN WESTERN AIR DEFENSE MISSILE SYSTEMS TO REPLACE CURRENT OUTDATED VARIETIES OF AA ARTILLERY AND COMPETE WITH THE SOVIET SA-3 SAM MISSILE SYSTEM CURRENTLY BEING ACQUIRED.

(II) ENCOURAGE THE PURCHASE OF WESTERN-MANUFACTURED COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT TO ENHANCE COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPACITY.

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(III) ENCOURAGE THE CONTINUATION OF CONUS TRAINING SUCH AS THE C AND GSC-LEVEL COURSE, OFFICER ADVANCE COURSES AND ARMY ORIENTATION TOURS.

(C) AIR FORCE

(I) SUPPORT THE ACQUISITION OF WESTERN-PRODUCED AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT LIKE THE BRITISH HAWK TRAINING AIRCRAFT, ACQUISITION OF WHICH IS CURRENTLY IN PROGRESS.

(II) ENCOURAGE PARTICIPATION IN US AIR FORCE TRAINING UNDER THE IMET PROGRAM.

(D) NAVY

(I) ENCOURAGE INCREASED PARTICIPATION IN US NAVY WAR COLLEGE COURSES, EXPAND TRAINING IN US NAVY SPECIALTY SCHOOLS, AND ENCOURAGE ACQUISITION OF US NAVY TRAIN-

ING AIDS, FILMS, ETC., VIA THE IMET PROGRAM.

(II) ENCOURAGE THE ACQUISITION OF WESTERN-MANUFACTURED PATROL BOATS, ANTI-SHIP WEAPONRY, SONARS, RADARS AND ECM EQUIPMENT.

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2. THREAT--THE 1948 TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (FCMA) BETWEEN FINLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION PLEDGES FINLAND WITH THE ASSISTANCE, IF NECESSARY, OF THE SOVIET UNION TO RESIST AN ATTACK ON THE USSR OVER FINNISH TERRITORY BY GERMANY OR ITS ALLIES. BECAUSE OF FINLAND'S UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE TERMS OF THE 1948 TREATY, FINLAND MUST PUBLICLY CONCERN ITSELF WITH THE THREAT ENVISIONED BY THE TREATY, I.E., AN ATTACK ON FINLAND FROM THE WEST. ALTHOUGH THE THREAT FROM THE WEST IS NOT TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP, THERE IS SOME CONCERN THAT THE USSR MIGHT FORCE FINLAND TO ACCEPT SOVIET AID, EVEN MILITARY FORCES, IF A SERIOUS CRISIS DEVELOPS IN EUROPE. CONSEQUENTLY, WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON ITS DEFENSE FORCES AND CAPABILITIES, FINNISH POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE THE SOVIET UNION THAT FINLAND HAS ITS OWN CAPABILITY OF RESISTING ATTACKS FROM THE WEST WITHOUT SOVIET ASSISTANCE. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT FINNISH LEADERSHIP PERCEIVES THE REAL POTENTIAL THREAT TO FINLAND COMING NOT FROM THE WEST BUT RATHER FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THUS, AT THE SAME TIME THAT FINLAND SEEKS TO BUILD SOVIET CONFIDENCE IN ITS ABILITY TO WARD OFF A WESTERN ATTACK, IT AIMS AT HAVING A MILITARY FORCE POTENT ENOUGH TO GIVE THE SOVIETS SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT INTRUDING INTO FINLAND. WHILE WE HAVE LITTLE DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF FINNISH DEFENSE PLANNING CONTINGENCIES, FINLAND APPEARS TO ADDRESS TWO TYPES OF POTENTIAL MILITARY THREAT FROM THE SOVIET UNION, NEITHER OF WHICH FINNISH LEADERSHIP CONSIDERS LIKELY EXCEPT IN THE CONTEXT OF A GENERAL EUROPEAN CRISIS.

(A) A SOVIET ATTACK ON SOUTHERN FINLAND--THIS WOULD
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BE THE MOST GRAVE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT TO FINNISH SOVEREIGNTY AS MOST OF THE POPULATION AND CRITICAL INSTALLATIONS OF FINLAND ARE LOCATED IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. THE FINNS WOULD PLAN TO USE

GUERRILLA-TYPE TACTICS AGAINST THE SOVIETS. THEY WOULD CONDUCT DELAYING OPERATIONS FROM THE BORDER, ALLOWING THE TRAINED AND LOCAL UNITS OPERATING IN REAR AREAS TO SLOW AND WEAKEN THE SOVIET ADVANCE. ONLY WHEN THE SOVIETS REACH CRITICAL ZONES, THE DEFENSE OF WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO NATIONAL SURVIVAL, WOULD MAIN-FORCE ELEMENTS ENGAGE IN DECISIVE BATTLE.

(B) A SOVIET THRUST THROUGH NORTHERN FINLAND INTO NORTHERN NORWAY--FINNISH LEADERSHIP APPARENTLY CONSIDERS THAT THE THREAT TO FINNISH SOVEREIGNTY STEMS NOT SO MUCH FROM SOVIET DESIGNS ON FINNISH TERRITORY AS FROM AN OVERALL SOVIET CONCERN DURING A CONFLICT WITH NATO TO PROTECT ITS HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF STRATEGIC ASSETS IN THE MURMANSK PECHENGA AREA OF THE KOLA PENINSULA AND TO CONTROL THE NORTHERN SEALANES TO ENSURE SAFE PASSAGE OF ITS NAVAL FORCES FROM MURMANSK TO THE ATLANTIC. IN ORDER FOR THE SOVIETS TO DO THAT AND AT THE SAME TIME DENY FORWARD BASES TO NATO, LIMITED ATTACKS INTO NORTHERN NORWAY TO SECURE THE NORTHERN COASTLINE MIGHT BE CONDUCTED. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS MAY NOT INITIALLY CHOOSE TO VIOLATE FINNISH TERRITORY IN THE NORTH TO ACCOMPLISH THESE OBJECTIVES, THE SOVIETS UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD POSITION FORCES ALONG THE FINNISH BORDER FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES. WITH THESE FORCES THE SOVIETS COULD QUICKLY EXERCISE THE OPTION OF CROSSING

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FINNISH TERRITORY TO ASSIST OTHER GROUND AND AMPHIBIOUS FORCES TO SEIZE THEIR OBJECTIVES IN NORTHERN NORWAY. SEIZURE OF OTHER PARTS OF FINLAND WOULD BE OF LITTLE STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE TO THE SOVIETS IN THE EARLY STAGE OF ANY EUROPEAN CONFLICT. FINNISH AUTHORITIES INSIST THAT THE DEFENSE OF FINLAND IS INDIVISIBLE AND HAVE RECENTLY STRENGTHENED FINNISH FORCES SOMEWHAT IN THE NORTH TO DRAMATIZE THE POINT. NEVERTHELESS, A HYPOTHESIZED SOVIET MOVE THROUGH FINNISH TERRITORY INTO NORWAY ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD BE SEEN BY THE FINNS AS A LESS DIRECT, FAR MORE AMBIGUOUS AND HENCE MORE DEBATABLE THREAT TO THE FUNDAMENTAL FINNISH NATIONAL INTEREST OF INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-PRESERVATION THAN WOULD BE A SOVIET ATTEMPT TO OCCUPY FINLAND. THE FINNISH REACTION TO A THREATENED OR ACTUAL SOVIET MILITARY MOVE ACROSS NORTHERN FINLAND WOULD PROBABLY VERY MUCH DEPEND ON THE EXACT NATURE OF THE SITUATION AND THE PREVAILING "ATMOSPHERICS."

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3. MISSION'S PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT--IF THE FINNISH PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT IS AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, OUTLINED ABOVE, IT GENERALLY COINCIDES WITH THE EMBASSY PERCEPTION. WE WOULD ADD THAT SOME SECTORS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND OTHER LEFTIST ELEMENTS WORK TO WEAKEN THE FINNISH DEFENSE FORCES AND TO RESTRICT THE MILITARY'S FINANCES, ACTIVITIES AND INFLUENCE. A GENERAL RELAXATION OF MILITARY TENSIONS IN EUROPE, THE PASSING OF THE GENERATION OF LEADERSHIP WITH WARTIME EXPERIENCE, AND THE EFFECTS OF CHANGING PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE USSR ARE ADDITIONAL FACTORS THAT COULD AFFECT THE MAINTENANCE OF A STRONG FINNISH DEFENSE COMMITMENT. WHILE CONCERN ON THESE POINTS IS WARRANTED, THERE NEVERTHELESS CONTINUES TO BE BROAD POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR A STRONG FINNISH DEFENSE FORCE, AND PRESENT GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP APPEARS DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN A LEVEL OF PREPAREDNESS WHICH WOULD CONVINCE POTENTIAL AGGRESSORS THAT "BENEFITS ACHIEVED BY FORCEFUL UTILIZATION OF OUR COUNTRY WOULD NOT BALANCE THE LOSSES SUFFERED, AND THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SUPPRESS OUR RESISTANCE RAPIDLY" (STATEMENT CONTAINED IN THE SECOND PARLIAMENTARY DEFENSE COMMITTEE REPORT, 1976).

4. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT--BECAUSE OF FINLAND'S SMALL SIZE AND GEOPOLITICAL RELATIONSHIP TO THE SOVIET UNION, THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT IS JUST ONE ELEMENT

OF FINLAND'S OVERALL SECURITY POLICY. OF THE TWO
PRIMARY ELEMENTS OF THAT SECURITY POLICY (FOREIGN
POLICY AND DEFENSE POLICY), FOREIGN POLICY IS
CONSIDERED THE MOST IMPORTANT. NATIONAL DEFENSE IS
SEEN WITHIN THE WHOLE OF SECURITY POLICY AS A
SUPPORT TO FOREIGN POLICY AND GUARANTOR OF ITS
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CONTINUITY IN THE EVENT OF A CRISIS AFFECTING
FINLAND. THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT IS ORGANIZED TO
PERFORM THREE PRIMARY MISSIONS: 1) SURVEILLANCE OF
THE LAND AND SEA, 2) PROTECTION OF THE TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY, AND 3) DEFENSE OF THE NATION. TO PERFORM
THESE FUNCTIONS, FINLAND HAS A SYSTEM OF UNIVERSAL
SERVICE WITH CONSCRIPTS SERVING LESS THAN A YEAR.
WITH THE SIZE OF THE ACTIVE MILITARY LIMITED BY
TREATY, DEFENSE OF THE NATION WOULD DEPEND
HEAVILY ON MOBILIZATION OF THE RESERVES AND A RELIANCE
ON GUERRILLA-TYPE TACTICS OUTLINED IN THE THREAT PARA-
GRAPH ABOVE.

5. ASSESSMENT OF THE FORCE--THE FDF COULDN'T DEFEND
FINLAND AGAINST A FULL-SCALE ATTACK BY A MAJOR POWER.
IT HAS A DEEP LOYALTY TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE
COUNTRY AND REPORTEDLY HAS PLANS TO CONTINUE RESISTANCE
WITH GUERRILLA WARFARE. STRENGTH FACTORS INCLUDE GOOD
LEADERSHIP AND DISCIPLINE; HIGH MORALE; TOUGH, DEDICATED
OFFICERS AND NCO'S; HARDY SOLDIERS; AND RIGOROUS,
INTENSE TRAINING WHICH STRESSES INDEPENDENT SMALL-UNIT
OPERATIONS UNDER WINTER CONDITIONS. PRINCIPAL WEAK-
NESSES ARE THE SMALL SIZE OF THE ACTIVE DUTY FORCE,
ITS DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN SOURCES OF MATERIAL, LACK
OF MODERN EQUIPMENT, AND SHORT CONSCRIPT SERVICE
PERIOD. THE MANPOWER POOL OF ELIGIBLE CONSCRIPTS IS
DECLINING, AND BEGINNING IN THE EARLY 1980'S THIS
WILL BE FELT. MORE ATTENTION TO RESERVES AND INCREASED
RESERVE TRAINING IS COUNTED ON TO MAKE UP FOR THE DEFICIT
IN CONSCRIPTS. IN ADDITION, THE MILITARY IS HAVING
AN INCREASINGLY HARD TIME RETAINING TECHNICALLY
QUALIFIED NCO'S DUE TO HIGHER PAY OFFERED BY CIVILIAN
FIRMS. MILITARY PAY SCALES HAVE NOT KEPT PACE WITH
THE COUNTRY'S RATE OF INFLATION.

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6. DEFENSE SPENDING--DEFENSE EXPENDITURES FOR CY 1980 ARE ESTIMATED AT APPROXIMATELY 500 MILLION DOLLARS. THIS REPRESENTS ONLY 1.7 PERCENT OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND ABOUT 4.5 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET. FOREIGN PURCHASES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES ARE ESTIMATED AT ABOUT 74 MILLION DOLLARS; HOWEVER THIS FIGURE REPRESENTS A VERY ROUGH ESTIMATION, AS INFORMATION ON MANY PURCHASES, PARTICULARLY THOSE FROM THE SOVIET UNION, ARE NOT RELEASED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF FINLAND. FINNISH TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION GENERALLY TAKES THE FORM OF LONG-TERM BILATERAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS AND CANNOT ALWAYS BE DETERMINED FROM A REVIEW OF FINNISH BUDGETS. MILITARY PURCHASES FROM THE SOVIET UNION ARE ESTIMATED TO BE BETWEEN 40 AND 50 MILLION DOLLARS ANNUALLY. US GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT OR US COMMERCIAL MILITARY-RELATED SALES TO FINLAND ARE INFLUENCED BY LEFTIST POLITICAL PRESSURES AND FINNISH AWARENESS OF SOVIET SENSITIVITIES AND GENERALLY RUN LESS THAN ONE MILLION DOLLARS

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PER YEAR. MAJOR MILITARY PURCHASES FROM THE UNITED STATES ARE HIGHLY UNLIKELY.

7. PROJECTION OF ACQUISITIONS SOUGHT FROM THE UNITED STATES--(PROJECTIONS SUBMITTED BY FY 80-84 MASP, NOT REQUIRED IN THIS REPORT.)

8. ASSESSMENT OF ITEMS PROJECTED FOR ACQUISITION--
ONLY IMET PROJECTED. FINNISH PURCHASES FROM THE US
GOVERNMENT CONSIST OF SMALL QUANTITIES OF MINOR ITEMS.
FMS CASES ARE GENERALLY HANDLED BY THE FINNISH
EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. THE ONLY CASES
PRESENTLY OPEN ARE FOR ROYALTY FEES ON PRC 77 RADIOS,
AND FOR THE PURCHASE OF A FEW MINOR MILITARY-ASSOCIATED
ITEMS. FDF NEED FOR SERVICES OBTAINED UNDER IMETP
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN POLITICAL RATHER THAN STRICTLY
MILITARY TERMS. THE WESTERN TRAINING HELPS TO
PROVIDE THE BALANCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. WHILE
THERE IS A SPECIFIC TRAINING BENEFIT FROM RECEIVING
MILITARY TRAINING IN THE UNITED STATES, MUCH MORE
IMPORTANT ARE THE FAVORABLE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF THE PROGRAM.

9. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ACQUISITION FROM THE UNITED
STATES--NONE.

10. ARMS CONTROL IMPACT OF ACQUISITION FROM THE
US--NONE.

11. HUMAN RIGHTS--THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS
DETERMINED THAT FINLAND SUPPORTS BROAD INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES, PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY,
AND THAT FINLAND'S HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE HAS
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BEEN "EXEMPLARY." TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES UNDER IMET
FURTHER STRENGTHEN APPRECIATION WITHIN THE FDF OF
OUR SHARED RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

12. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER
SOURCES--FINNISH DEFENSE EXPENDITURES ARE ALMOST TOTALLY
FINANCED FROM DOMESTIC RESOURCES, I.E., THROUGH
ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS IN THE GOVERNMENT NATIONAL
BUDGET. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE DEFENSE
FORCES RELY ON DOMESTICALLY PRODUCED ITEMS; HOWEVER,
A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MAJOR ITEMS ARE OF FOREIGN
MANUFACTURE. ALTHOUGH FINLAND ATTEMPTS TO MAINTAIN
ITS NEUTRAL POSITION BY BALANCING PURCHASES FROM
EASTERN AND WESTERN SOURCES, A LARGE SHARE OF THE
FOREIGN PURCHASES COME FROM THE SOVIET UNION, AS NOTED
ABOVE.

13. PROGRAM LEVELS.

A. LEVEL 1 (MINIMUM LEVEL): 25,000 DOLLARS. THIS
WOULD PROVIDE FOR THE ATTENDANCE OF ONE OFFICER AT A
COMMAND AND STAFF LEVEL COLLEGE AND ONE THREE-MAN
ORIENTATION TOUR PER YEAR. TO MAINTAIN THE PROGRAM

AT THIS LEVEL IS OF QUESTIONABLE VALUE, AND IT COULD CERTAINLY NOT BE REDUCED BEYOND THIS LEVEL.
B. LEVEL 2 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL) : 40,000 DOLLARS. PROVIDES FOR COURSES PRESENTLY BEING USED BY THE FDF BUT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR ANY OPPORTUNITY TO OFFER NEW OR ONE-TIME COURSES OR PROGRAMS.

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C. LEVEL 3 (CURRENT LEVEL) : 50,000 DOLLARS. PROVIDES FOR COURSES AND PROGRAMS PRESENTLY BEING USED PLUS PROVIDES A SMALL AMOUNT OF FUNDS TO ALLOW THE EMBASSY TO OFFER PARTICIPATION IN ONE-TIME COURSES.
D. INCREMENTAL LEVEL: AS THE SIZE OF IMETP IS GENERALLY LIMITED BY FDF ACCEPTANCE OF COURSES AND BY THE REALITIES OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION HERE, ADDITIONAL FUNDING WOULD NOT BE OF VALUE AT THIS TIME.
E. BECAUSE OF THE SIZE AND NATURE OF THE PROGRAM IN FINLAND, THE 50,000 DOLLARS PROJECTED IN THE MASP REPRESENTS BOTH THE MAXIMUM AND THE MINIMUM FOR AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAM. A LARGER PROGRAM WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED BY THE FDF AND A SMALLER PROGRAM WOULD BE SO SMALL AS TO MAKE ITS IMAGE AS WELL AS COST EFFECTIVENESS QUESTIONABLE.
F. N.A.
G. N.A,

H. DESCRIPTION OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF TRAINING. THE
ANNUAL IMETP FOR FINLAND CONSISTS OF SENDING ONE
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OFFICER TO A COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE, SENDIN A
GROUP OF THREE ARMY OFFICERS ON A ORIENTATION
TOUR, AND THE TRAINING OF THREE OR FOUR OFFICERS IN
VARIOUS SPECIALTY COURSES SUCH AS RANGER TRAINING.
IN ASSESSING THE IMETP IN FINLAND, IT SHOULD BE
NOTED THAT THE LIMITATION OF THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF
SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO FINLAND IS IMPOSED MAINLY BY
THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF NEUTRALITY. THE
PROGRAM REPRESENTS A SMALL EFFORT WHEN COMPARED TO
THE BROADER MILITARY EXCHANGES WITH WARSAW PACT
COUNTRIES, BUT IT PROVIDES AN IMPORTANT BALANCE TO
THOSE EXCHANGES. BECAUSE OF THEIR LIMITED BUDGET AND
THE GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION, THE FINNISH
DEFENSE FORCES WOULD NOT SHARE A GREATER COST OF
THIS PROGRAM. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM DEPENDS
ON ITS BEING MAINTAINED AT LEAST AT THE PRESENT LEVEL
AND BEING A FULLY US FUNDED PROGRAM.
I. AMBASSADOR RECOMMENDED LEVEL OF FUNDING--50,000
DOLLARS, EACH YEAR.

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Previous Classification: SECRET
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Reference: 78 STATE 167901
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
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SAS ID: 1929180
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE: FINLAND
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, XX, FI, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
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